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Abstract We propose a novel notion of pointer race for concurrent programs ma-
nipulating a shared heap. A pointer race is an access to a memory address which
was freed, and it is out of the accessor’s control whether or not the cell has been
re-allocated. We establish two results. (1) Under the assumption of pointer race
freedom, it is sound to verify a program running under explicit memory manage-
ment as if it was running with garbage collection. (2) Even the requirement of
pointer race freedom itself can be verified under the garbage-collected semantics.
We then prove analogues of the theorems for a stronger notion of pointer race
needed to cope with performance-critical code purposely using racy comparisons
and even racy dereferences of pointers. As a practical contribution, we apply our
results to optimize a thread-modular analysis under explicit memory manage-
ment. Our experiments confirm a speed-up of up to two orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
Today, one of the main challenges in verification is the analysis of concurrent programs
that manipulate a shared heap. The numerous interleavings among the threads make it
hard to predict the dynamic evolution of the heap. This is even more true if explicit
memory management has to be taken into account. With garbage collection as in Java,
an allocation request results in a fresh address that was not being pointed to. The address
is hence known to be owned by the allocating thread. With explicit memory manage-
ment as in C, this ownership guarantee does not hold. An address may be re-allocated
as soon as it has been freed, even if there are still pointers to it. This missing ownership
significantly complicates reasoning against the memory-managed semantics.
In the present paper, we carefully investigate the relationship between the memory-
managed semantics and the garbage-collected semantics. We show that the difference
only becomes apparent if there are programming errors of a particular form that we refer
to as pointer races. A pointer race is a situation where a thread uses a pointer that has
been freed before. We establish two theorems. First, if the memory-managed seman-
tics is free from pointer races, then it coincides with the garbage-collected semantics.
Second, whether or not the memory-managed semantics contains a pointer race can be
checked with the garbage-collected semantics.
The developed semantic understanding helps to optimize program analyses. We
show that the more complicated verification of the memory-managed semantics can
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often be reduced to an analysis of the simpler garbage-collected semantics — by ap-
plying the following policy: check under garbage collection whether the program is
pointer race free. If there are pointer races, tell the programmer about these poten-
tial bugs. If there are no pointer races, rely on the garbage-collected semantics in all
further analyses. In thread-modular reasoning, one of the motivations for our work,
restricting to the garbage-collected semantics allows us to use a smaller abstract do-
main and an optimized fixed point computation. Particularly, it removes the need to
correlate the local states of threads, and it restricts the possibilities of how threads can
influence one another.
Example 1. We illustrate the idea of pointer race freedom on Treiber’s stack [13], a
lock-free implementation of a concurrent stack that provides the following methods:
// global variables: pTop
void : push(v)
pnode := malloc;(1)
pnode.data := v;(2)
repeat(3)
ptop := pTop;(4)
pnode.next := ptop;(5)
until cas(pTop,ptop,pnode);(6)
bool : pop(&v)
repeat(7)
ptop := pTop;(8)
if (ptop = null) return false;(9)
pnode := ptop.next;(10)
until cas(pTop,ptop,pnode);(11)
v := ptop.data;(12)
ptop := free; return true;(13)
This code is correct (i.e. linearizable and pops return the latest value pushed) in the
presence of garbage collection, but it is incorrect under explicit memory management.
The memory-managed semantics suffers from a problem known as ABA, which indeed
is related to a pointer race. The problem arises as follows. Some thread t executing
pop sets its local variable ptop to the global top of the stack pTop, say address a. The
variable pnode is assigned the second topmost address b. While t executes pop, another
thread frees address a with a pop. Since it has been freed, address a can be re-allocated
and pushed, becoming the top of the stack again. However, the stack might have grown
in between the free and the re-allocation. As a consequence, b is no longer the second
node from the top. Thread t now executes the cas (atomic compare-and-swap). The
command first tests pTop = ptop (to check for consistency of the program state: has
the top of the stack moved?). The test passes since pTop has come back to a due to the
re-allocation. Thread t then redirects pTop to pnode. This is a pointer race: t relies on
the variable ptop where the address was freed, and the re-allocation was not under t’s
control. At the same time, this causes an error. If pnode no longer points to the second
address from the top, moving pTop loses stack content. uunionsq
Performance-critical implementations often intentionally make use of pointer races
and employ other mechanisms to protect themselves from harmful effects due to
accidental re-allocations. The corrected version of Treiber’s stack [9] for example
equips every pointer with a version counter logging the updates. Pointer assignments
then assign the address together with the value of the associated version counter,
and the counters are taken into account in the comparisons within cas. That is, the
cas(pTop,ptop,pnode) command atomically executes the following code:
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if (pTop = ptop ∧ pTop.version= ptop.version) {
pTop := pnode; pTop.version := ptop.version+1; return true;
} else { return false; }
This makes the cas from Example 1 fail and prevents stack corruption. Another pointer
race occurs when the pop in Line (10) dereferences a freed pointer. With version coun-
ters, this is harmless. Our basic theory, however, would consider the comparison as well
as the dereference pointer races, deeming the corrected version of Treiber’s stack buggy.
To cope with performance-critical applications that implement version counters or
techniques such as hazard pointers [10], reference counting [6], or grace periods [8],
we strengthen the notion of pointer race. We let it tolerate assertions on freed pointers
and dereferences of freed pointers where the value obtained by the dereference does
not visibly influence the computation (e.g., it is assigned to a dead variable). To analyse
programs that are only free from strong pointer races, the garbage-collected semantics
is no longer sufficient. We define a more general ownership-respecting semantics by
imposing an ownership discipline on top of the memory-managed semantics. With this
semantics, we are able to show the following analogues of the above results. First, if the
program is free from strong pointer races (SPRF) under the memory-managed seman-
tics, then the memory-managed semantics coincides with the ownership-respecting se-
mantics. Second, the memory-managed semantics is SPRF if and only if the ownership-
respecting semantics is SPRF.
As a last contribution, we show how to apply our theory to optimize thread-modular
reasoning. The idea of thread-modular analysis is to buy efficiency by abstracting from
the relationship between the local states of individual threads. The loss of precision,
however, is often too severe. For instance, any inductive invariant strong enough to
show memory safety of Treiber’s stack must correlate the local states of threads. Thread-
modular analyses must compensate this loss of precision. Under garbage collection, an
efficient way used e.g. in [7,16] is keeping as a part of the local state of each thread infor-
mation about the ownership of memory addresses. A thread owns an allocated address.
No other thread can access it until it enters the shared part of the heap. Unfortunately,
this exclusivity cannot be guaranteed under the memory-managed semantics. Addresses
can be re-allocated with pointers of other threads still pointing to them. Works such as
[14,1] therefore correlate the local states of threads by more expensive means (cf. Sec-
tion 5), for which they pay by severely decreased scalability.
We apply our theory to put back ownership information into thread-modular rea-
soning under explicit memory management. We measure the impact of our technique
on the method of [1] when used to prove linearizability of programs such as Treiber’s
stack or Michael & Scott’s lock-free queue under explicit memory management. We
report on resource savings of about two orders of magnitude.
Contributions We claim the following contributions, where [[P]]mm denotes the
memory-managed semantics, [[P]]own the ownership-respecting semantics, and [[P]]gc
the garbage-collected semantics of program P.
(1) We define a notion of pointer race freedom (PRF) and an equivalence ≈ among
computations such that the following two results hold.
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(1.1) If [[P]]mm is PRF, then [[P]]mm ≈ [[P]]gc.
(1.2) [[P]]mm is PRF if and only if [[P]]gc is PRF.
(2) We define a notion of strong pointer race freedom (SPRF) and an ownership-
respecting semantics [[P]]own such that the following two results hold.
(2.1) If [[P]]mm is SPRF, then [[P]]mm = [[P]]own.
(2.2) [[P]]mm is SPRF if and only if [[P]]own is SPRF.
(3) Using the Results (2.1) and (2.2), we optimize the recent thread-modular analy-
sis [1] by a use of ownership and report on an experimental evaluation.
The Results (2.1) and (2.2) give less guarantees than (1.1) and (1.2) and hence allow
for less simplifications of program analyses. On the other hand, the stronger notion of
pointer race makes (2.1) and (2.2) applicable to a wider class of programs which would
be racy in the original sense (which is the case for our most challenging benchmarks).
Finally, we note that our results are not only relevant for concurrent programs but
apply to sequential programs as well. The point in the definition of pointer race freedom
is to guarantee the following: the execution does not depend on whether a malloc has re-
allocated an address, possibly with other pointers still pointing to it, or it has allocated
a fresh address. However, it is mainly reasoning about concurrent programs where we
see a motivation to strive for such guarantees.
Related Work Our work was inspired by the data race freedom (DRF) guarantee [2].
The DRF guarantee can be understood as a contract between hardware architects and
programming language designers. If the program is DRF under sequential consistency
(SC), then the semantics on the actual architecture will coincide with SC. We split the
analogue of the statement into two, coincidence ([[P]]mm PRF implies [[P]]mm ≈ [[P]]gc)
and means of checking ([[P]]mm PRF iff [[P]]gc PRF). There are works that weaken the
DRF requirement while still admitting efficient analyses [12,3,4]. Our notion of strong
pointer races is along this line.
The closest related work is [8]. Gotsman et al. study re-allocation under explicit
memory management. The authors focus on lock-free data structures implemented with
hazard pointers, read-copy-update, or epoch-based reclamation. The key observation is
that all three techniques rely on a common synchronization pattern called grace periods.
Within a grace period of a cell a and a thread t, the thread can safely access the cell
without having to fear a free command. The authors give thread-modular reasoning
principles for grace periods and show that they lead to elegant and scalable proofs.
The relationship with our work is as follows. If grace periods are respected, then
the program is guaranteed to be SPRF (there are equality checks on freed addresses).
Hence, using Theorem 3 in this work, it is sufficient to verify lock-free algorithms
under the ownership-respecting semantics. Interestingly, Gotsman et al. had an intuitive
idea of pointer races without making the notion precise (quote: ...potentially harmful
race between threads accessing nodes and those trying to reclaim them is avoided [8]).
Moreover, they did not study the implications of race freedom on the semantics, which
is the main interest of this paper. We stress that our approach does not make assumptions
about the synchronization strategy. Finally, Gotsman et al. do not consider the problem
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of checking the synchronization scheme required by grace periods. We show that PRF
and SPRF can actually be checked on simpler semantics.
Data refinement in the presence of low-level memory operation is studied in [11].
The work defines a notion of substitutability that only requires a refinement of error-
free computations. In particular, there is no need to refine computations that dereference
dangling pointers. In our terms, these dereferences yield pointer races. We consider [11]
as supporting our requirement for (S)PRF.
The practical motivation of our work, thread-modular analysis [5], has already been
discussed. We note the adaptation to heap-manipulating programs [7]. Interesting is also
the combination with separation logic from [16,15] (which uses ownership to improve
precision). There are other works studying shape analysis and thread-modular analysis.
As these fields are only a part of the motivation, we do not provide a full overview.
2 Heap-manipulating Programs
Syntax We consider concurrent heap-manipulating programs, defined to be sets
of threads P = {t1, t2, . . .} from a set Thrd. We do not assume finiteness of programs.
This ensures our results carry over to programs with a parametric number of threads.
Threads t are ordinary while-programs operating on data and pointer variables. Data
variables are denoted by x,y ∈ DVar. For pointer variables, we use p,q ∈ PVar. We
assume DVar∩PVar = /0 and obey this typing. Pointer variables come with selectors
p.next1, . . . ,p.nextn and p.data for finitely many pointer fields and one data field
(for simplicity; the generalization to arbitrary data fields is straightforward). We use pt
to refer to pointers p and p.next. Similarly, by dt we mean data variables x and the
corresponding selectors p.data. Pointer and data variables are either local to a thread,
indicated by p,x ∈ localt, or they are shared among the threads in the program. We use
shared for the set of all shared variables.
The commands com ∈ Com employed in our while-language are
cond ::= p = q p x = y p ¬cond
com ::= assert cond p p := malloc p p := free
p q := p.next p p.next := q p p := q
p x := p.data p p.data := x p x := op(x1, . . . ,xn) .
Pointer variables are allocated with p := malloc and freed via p := free. Pointers and
data variables can be used in assignments. These assignments are subject to typing: we
only assign pointers to pointers and data to data. Moreover, a thread only uses shared
variables and its own local variables. To compute on data variables, we support opera-
tions op that are not specified further. We only assume that the program comes with a
data domain (Dom,Op) so that its operations op stem from Op. We support assertions
that depend on equalities and inequalities among pointers and data variables. Like in if
and while commands, we require assertions to have complements: if a control location
has a command assert cond, then it also has a command assert ¬cond. We use as a
running example the program in Example 1, Treiber’s stack [13].
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Semantics A heap is defined over a set of addresses Adr that contains the distinguished
element seg. Value seg indicates that a pointer has not yet been assigned a cell and thus
its data and next selectors cannot be accessed. Such an access would result in a segfault.
A heap gives the valuation of pointer variables PVar 9 Adr, the valuation of the next
selector functions Adr9 Adr, the valuation of the data variables DVar9Dom, and the
valuation of the data selector fields Adr9 Dom. In Section 3, we will restrict heaps to
a subset of so-called valid pointers. To handle such restrictions, it is convenient to let
heaps evaluate expressions a.next rather than next functions. Moreover, with the use
of restrictions valuation functions will typically be partial.
Let PExp := PVarunionmulti{a.next | a ∈ Adr \ {seg} and next a selector} be the set of
pointer expressions and DExp := DVarunionmulti{a.data | a ∈ Adr \{seg}} be the set of data
expressions. A heap is a pair h = (pval,dval) with pval : PExp9 Adr the valuation of
the pointer expressions and dval : DExp9 Dom the valuation of the data expressions.
We use pexp and dexp for a pointer and a data expression, and also write h(pexp) or
h(dexp). The valuation functions are clear from the expression. The addresses inside
the heap that are actually in use are
adr(h) := (dom(pval)∪ range(pval)∪dom(dval))∩Adr.
Here, we use {a.next}∩Adr := {a} and similar for data selectors.
We model heap modifications with updates [pexp 7→ a] and [dexp 7→ d] from the
set Upd. Update [pexp 7→ a] turns the partial function pval into the new partial func-
tion pval[pexp 7→ a] with dom(pval[pexp 7→ a]) := dom(pval)∪{pexp}. It is defined by
pval[pexp 7→ a](qexp) := pval(qexp) if qexp 6= pexp, and pval[pexp 7→ a](pexp) := a.
We also write h[pexp 7→ a] since the valuation that is altered is clear from the update.
We define three semantics for concurrent heap-manipulating programs. All three are
in terms of computations, sequences of actions from Act := Thrd×Com×Upd. An
action act = (t,com,up) consist of a thread t, a command com executed in the thread,
and an update up. By thrd(act) := t, com(act) := com, and upd(act) := up we access
the thread, the command, and the update in act. To make the heap resulting from a
computation τ ∈ Act∗ explicit, we define hε := ( /0, /0) and hτ.act := hτ[upd(act)]. So we
modify the current heap with the update required by the last action.
The garbage-collected semantics and the memory-managed semantics only differ
on allocations. We define a strict form of garbage collection that never re-allocates a
cell. With this, we do not have to define unreachable parts of the heap that should
be garbage collected. We only model computations that are free from segfaults. This
means a transition accessing next and data selectors is enabled only if the corresponding
pointer is assigned a cell.
Formally, the garbage-collected semantics of a program P, denoted by [[P]]gc, is a
set of computations in Act∗. The definition is inductive. In the base case, we have single
actions (⊥,⊥, [pval,dval]) ∈ [[P]]gc with pval : PVar→ {seg} and dval : DVar→ Dom
arbitrary. No pointer variable is mapped to a cell and the data variables contain arbitrary
values. In the induction step, consider τ ∈ [[P]]gc where thread t is ready to execute
command com. Then τ.(t,com,up) ∈ [[P]]gc, provided one of the following rules holds.
(Asgn) Let com be p.next := q, hτ(p)= a 6= seg, hτ(q)= b. We set up= [a.next 7→ b].
The remaining assignments are similar.
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(Asrt) Let com be assert p = q. The precondition is hτ(p) = hτ(q). There are no
updates, up = /0. The assertion with a negated condition is defined analogously. A
special case occurs if hτ(p) or hτ(q) is seg. Then the assert and its negation will
pass. Intuitively, undefined pointers hold arbitrary values. Our development does
not depend on this modeling choice.
(Free) If com is p := free, there are no constraints and no updates.
(Malloc1) Let com be p := malloc, a /∈ adr(hτ), and d ∈ Dom. Then we define
up = [p 7→ a,a.data 7→ d,{a.next 7→ seg | for every selector next}]. The rule
only allocates cells that have not been used in the computation. Such a cell holds
an arbitrary data value and the next selectors have not yet been allocated.
With explicit memory management, we can re-allocate a cell as soon as it has been
freed. Formally, the memory-managed semantics [[P]]mm ⊆ Act∗ is defined like [[P]]gc
but has a second allocation rule:
(Malloc2) Let com be p := malloc and a ∈ freedτ. Then up = [p 7→ a].
Note that (Malloc2) does not alter the selectors of address a. The set freedτ contains
the addresses that have been allocated in τ and freed afterwards. The definition is by
induction. In the base case, we have freedε := /0. The step case is
freedτ.(t,p:=free,up) := freedτ∪{a}, if hτ(p) = a 6= seg
freedτ.(t,p:=malloc,up) := freedτ \{a}, if malloc returns a
freedτ.(t,act,up) := freedτ, otherwise.
3 Pointer Race Freedom
We show that for well-behaved programs the garbage-collected semantics coincides
with the memory-managed semantics. Well-behaved means there is no computation
where one pointer frees a cell and later a dangling pointer accesses this cell. We call
such a situation a pointer race, referring to the fact that the free command and the
access are not synchronized, for otherwise the access should have been avoided. To
apply this equivalence, we continue to show how to reduce the check for pointer race
freedom itself to the garbage-collected semantics.
3.1 PRF Guarantee
The definition of pointer races relies on a notion of validity for pointer expressions. To
capture the situation sketched above, a pointer is invalidated if the cell it points to is
freed. A pointer race is now an access to an invalid pointer. The definition of validity
requires care when we pass pointers. Consider an assignment p := q.next where q
points to a and a.next points to b. Then p becomes a valid pointer to b only if both q
and a.next were valid. In Definition 1, we use pexp to uniformly refer to p and a.next
on the left-hand side of assignments. In particular, we evaluate pointer variables p to
hτ(p) = a and write a.next := q for the assignment p.next := q.
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Definition 1. The valid pointer expressions in a computation τ ∈ [[P]]mm, denoted by
validτ ⊆ PExp, are defined inductively by validε := PExp and
validτ.(t,p:=q.next,up) := validτ∪{p}, if q ∈ validτ∧hτ(q).next ∈ validτ
validτ.(t,p:=q.next,up) := validτ \{p}, if q /∈ validτ∨hτ(q).next /∈ validτ
validτ.(t,pexp:=q,up) := validτ∪{pexp}, if q ∈ validτ
validτ.(t,pexp:=q,up) := validτ \{pexp}, if q /∈ validτ
validτ.(t,p:=free,up) := validτ \ invalida, if a = hτ(p)
validτ.(t,p:=malloc,up) := validτ∪{p},
validτ.(t,act,up) := validτ, otherwise.
If a 6= seg, then invalida := {pexp | hτ(pexp)= a}∪{a.next1, . . . ,a.nextn}. If a= seg,
then invalida := /0.
When we pass a valid pointer, this validates the receiver (adds it to validτ). When we
pass an invalid pointer, this invalidates the receiver. As a result, only some selectors of
an address may be valid. When we free an address a 6= seg, all expressions that point
to a as well as all next selectors of a become invalid. This has the effect of isolating a
so that the address behaves like a fresh one for valid pointers. A malloc validates the
respective pointer but does not validate the next selectors of the allocated address.
Definition 2 (Pointer Race). A computation τ.(t,com,up)∈ [[P]]mm is called a pointer
race (PR), if com is
(i) a command containing p.data or p.next or p := free with p /∈ validτ, or
(ii) an assertion containing p /∈ validτ.
The last action of a PR is said to raise a PR. A set of computations is pointer race free
(PRF) if it does not contain a PR. In Example 1, the discussed comparison pTop= ptop
within cas raises a PR since ptop is invalid. It is worth noting that we can still pass
around freed addresses without raising a PR. This means the memory-managed and the
garbage-collected semantics will not yield isomorphic heaps, but only yield isomorphic
heaps on the valid pointers. We now define the notion of isomorphism among heaps h.
A function fadr : adr(h)→ Adr is an address mapping, if fadr(a) = seg if and only
if a= seg. Every address mapping induces a function fexp : dom(h)→ PExp∪DExp on
the pointer and data expressions inside the heap by
fexp(p) := p fexp(x) := x
fexp(a.next) := fadr(a).next fexp(a.data) := fadr(a).data.
Pointer and data variables are mapped identically. Pointers on the heap a.next are
mapped to fadr(a).next as defined by the address mapping, and similar for the data.
Definition 3. Two heaps h1 and h2 with hi = (pvali,dvali) are isomorphic, denoted by
h1 ≡ h2, if there is a bijective address mapping isoadr : adr(h1)→ adr(h2) where the
induced isoexp : dom(h1)→ dom(h2) is again bijective and satisfies
isoadr(pval1(pexp)) = pval2(isoexp(pexp)) dval1(dexp) = dval2(isoexp(dexp)).
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To prove a correspondence between the two semantics, we restrict heaps to the valid
pointers. The restriction operation keeps the data selectors for all addresses that remain.
To be more precise, let h = (pval,dval) and P⊆ PExp. The restriction of h to P is the
new heap h|P := (pval|P,dval|D) with
D := DVar∪{a.data | ∃pexp ∈ dom(pval)∩P : pval(pexp) = a} .
Restriction and update enjoy a pleasant interplay with isomorphism.
Lemma 1. Let h1 ≡ h2 via isoadr and let P⊆ PExp. Then
h1|P ≡ h2|isoexp(P) (14)
h1[a.next 7→ b]≡ h2[a′.next 7→ b′] (15)
h1[a.data 7→ d]≡ h2[a′.data 7→ d]. (16)
Isomorphisms (15) and (16) have a side condition. If a ∈ adr(h1) then a′ = isoadr(a). If
a /∈ adr(h1) then a′ /∈ adr(h2), and similar for b.
Two computations are heap equivalent, if their sequences of actions coincide when
projected to the threads and commands, and if the resulting heaps are isomorphic on the
valid part. We use ↓ for projection.
Definition 4. Computations τ,σ ∈ [[P]]mm are heap-equivalent, τ≈ σ, if
τ ↓Thrd×Com = σ ↓Thrd×Com and hτ|validτ ≡ hσ|validσ .
We also write [[P]]mm ≈ [[P]]gc to state that for every computation τ ∈ [[P]]mm, there is a
computation σ ∈ [[P]]gc with τ≈ σ, and vice versa.
We are now ready to state the PRF guarantee. The idea is to consider pointer races
programming errors. If a program has pointer races, the programmer should be warned.
If the program is PRF, further analyses can rely on the garbage-collected semantics:
Theorem 1 (PRF Guarantee). If [[P]]mm is PRF, then [[P]]mm ≈ [[P]]gc.
The memory-managed semantics of Treiber’s stack suffers from the ABA-problem
while the garbage-collected semantics does not. The two are not heap-equivalent. By
Theorem 1, the difference is due to a PR. One such race is discussed in Example 1.
In the proof of Theorem 1, the inclusion from right to left always holds. The reverse
direction needs information about the freed addresses: if an address has been freed, it
no longer occurs in the valid part of the heap — provided the computation is PRF.
Lemma 2. Assume τ ∈ [[P]]mm is PRF. Then freedτ∩adr(hτ|validτ) = /0.
Lemma 1 and 2 allow us to prove Proposition 1. The result implies the missing
direction of Theorem 1 and will also be helpful later on.
Proposition 1. Consider τ ∈ [[P]]mm PRF. Then there is σ ∈ [[P]]gc with σ≈ τ.
To apply Theorem 1, one has to prove [[P]]mm PRF. We develop a technique for this.
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3.2 Checking PRF
We show that checking pointer race freedom for the memory-managed semantics can be
reduced to checking pointer race freedom for the garbage-collected semantics. The key
argument is that the earliest possible PR always lie in the garbage-collected semantics.
Technically, we consider a shortest PR in the memory-managed semantics and from this
construct a PR in the garbage-collected semantics.
Theorem 2 (Checking PRF). [[P]]mm is PRF if and only if [[P]]gc is PRF.
To illustrate the result, the pointer race in Example 1 belongs to the memory-managed
semantics. Under garbage collection, there is a similar computation which does not re-
allocate a. Freeing a still renders ptop invalid and, as before, leads to a PR in cas. The
proof of Theorem 2 applies Proposition 1 to mimic the shortest racy computation up to
the last action. To mimic the action that raises the PR, we need the fact that an invalid
pointer variable does not hold seg, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a PRF computation σ∈ [[P]]gc. (i) If p /∈ validσ, then hσ(p) 6= seg.
(ii) If pexp∈ validσ, hσ(pexp) = a 6= seg, and a.next /∈ validσ, then hσ(a.next) 6= seg.
While the completeness proof of Theorem 2 is non-trivial, checking PRF for [[P]]gc
is an easy task. One instruments the given program P to a new program P′ as follows:
P′ tags every address that is freed and checks whether a tagged address is dereferenced,
freed, or used in an assertion. In this case, P′ enters a distinguished goal state.
Proposition 2. [[P]]gc is PRF if and only if [[P′]]gc cannot reach the goal state.
For the correctness proof, we only need to observe that under garbage collection the
invalid pointers are precisely the pointers to the freed cells.
Lemma 4. Let σ ∈ [[P]]gc and hσ(pexp) = a 6= seg. Then pexp /∈ validσ iff a ∈ freedσ.
The lemma does not hold for the memory-managed semantics. Moreover, the statement
turns Lemma 2, which can be read as an implication, into an equivalence. Namely,
Lemma 2 says that if a pointer has been freed, then it cannot be valid. Under the as-
sumtpions of Lemma 4, it also holds that if a pointer is not valid, then it has been freed.
4 Strong Pointer Race Freedom
The programing style in which a correct program should be pointer race free counts on
the following policy: a memory address is freed only if it is not meant to be touched
until its re-allocation, by any means possible.
This simplified treatment of dynamic memory is practical in common programing
tasks, but the authors of performance-critical applications are often forced to employ
subtler techniques. For example, the version of Treiber’s stack equipped with version
counters to prevent ABA under explicit memory management contains two violations
of the simple policy, both of which are pointer races. (1) The cas may compare in-
valid pointers. This could potentially lead to ABA, but the programmer prevents the
harmful effect of re-allocation using version counters, which make the cas fail. (2) The
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command pnode := ptop.next in Line (10) of pop may dereference the next field of a
freed (and therefore invalid) pointer. This is actually correct only under the assumption
that neither the environment nor any thread of the program itself may redirect a once
valid pointer outside the accessible memory (otherwise the dereference could lead to a
segfault). The value obtained by the dereference may again be influenced by that the
address was re-allocated. The reason for why this is fine is that the subsequent cas is
bound to fail, which makes pnode a dead variable — its value does not matter.
In both cases, the programmer only prevents side effects of an accidental re-
allocation. He uses a subtler policy and frees an address only if its content is not meant
to be of any relevance any more. Invalid addresses can still be compared, and their
pointer fields can even be dereferenced unless the obtained value influences the control.
4.1 SPRF Guarantee
We introduce a stronger notion of pointer race that expresses the above subtler policy.
In the definition, we will call strongly invalid the pointer expressions that have obtained
their value from dereferencing an invalid/freed pointer.
Definition 5 (Strong Invalidity). The set of strongly invalid expressions in τ∈ [[P]]mm,
denoted by sinvalidτ ⊆ PExp∪DExp, is defined inductively by sinvalidε := /0 and
sinvalidτ.(t,p:=q.next,up) := sinvalidτ∪{p}, if q 6∈ validτ
sinvalidτ.(t,pexp:=q,up) := sinvalidτ∪{pexp}, if q ∈ sinvalidτ
sinvalidτ.(t,x:=q.data,up) := sinvalidτ∪{x}, if q 6∈ validτ
sinvalidτ.(t,dexp:=x,up) := sinvalidτ∪{dexp}, if x ∈ sinvalidτ
sinvalidτ.act := sinvalidτ \ validτ.act, in all other cases.
The value obtained by dereferencing a freed pointer may depend on actions of other
threads that point to the cell due to re-allocation. However, by assuming that a once valid
pointer can never be set to seg, we obtain a guarantee that the actions of other threads
cannot prevent the dereference itself from being executed (they cannot make it segfault).
Assigning the uncontrolled value to a local variable is therefore not harmful. We only
wish to prevent a correct computation from being influenced by that value. We thus
define incorrect/racy any attempt to compare or dereference the value. Then, besides
allowing for the creation of strongly invalid pointers, the notion of strong pointer race
strengthens PR by tolerating comparisons of invalid pointers.
Definition 6 (Strong Pointer Race). A computation τ.(t,com,up)∈ [[P]]mm is a strong
pointer race (SPR), if the command com is one of the following:
(i) p.next := q or p.data := x or p := free with p /∈ validτ
(ii) an assertion containing p or x in sinvalidτ
(iii) a command containing p.next or p.data where p ∈ sinvalidτ.
The last action of an SPR raises an SPR. A set of computations is strong pointer race
free (SPRF) if it does not contain an SPR. An SPR can be seen in Example 1 as a
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continuation of the race ending at cas. The subsequent ptop := free raises an SPR as
ptop is invalid. The implementation corrected with version counters is SPRF.
Theorems 1 and 2 no longer hold for strong pointer race freedom. It is not possible
to verify [[P]]mm modulo SPRF by analysing [[P]]gc. The reason is that the garbage-
collected semantics does not cover SPRF computations that compare or dereference
invalid pointers. To formulate a sound analogy of the theorems, we have to replace
[[.]]gc by a more powerful semantics. This, however, comes with a trade-off. The new
semantics should still be amenable to efficient thread-modular reasoning.
The idea of our new semantics [[P]]own is to introduce the concept of ownership to
the memory-managed semantics, and show that SPRF computations stick to it. Unlike
with garbage collection, we cannot use a naive notion of ownership that guarantees the
owner exclusive access to an address. This is too strong a guarantee. In [[P]]mm, other
threads may still have access to an owned address via invalid pointers. Instead, we
design ownership such that dangling pointers are not allowed to influence the owner.
The computation will thus proceed as if the owner had allocated a fresh address.
To this end, we let a thread own an allocated address until one of the two events
happen: either (1) the address is published, that is, it enters the shared part of the heap
(which consists of addresses reached from shared variables by following valid pointers
and of freed addresses), or (2) the address is compromised, that is, the owner finds out
that the cell is not fresh by comparing it with an invalid pointer. Taking away ownership
in this situation is needed since the owner can now change its behavior based on the re-
allocation. The owner may also spread the information about the re-allocation among
the other threads and change their behavior, too. It can thus no longer be guaranteed
that the computation will continue as if a fresh address had been allocated.
Definition 7 (Owned Addresses). For τ ∈ [[P]]mm and a thread t, we define the set of
addresses owned by t, denoted by ownτ(t), as ownε(t) := /0 and
ownτ.(t,p:=malloc,up)(t) :=ownτ(t)∪{a}, if p ∈ localt and malloc returns a
ownτ.(t,p:=free, /0)(t) :=ownτ(t)\{hτ(p)}, if p ∈ validτ
ownτ.(t,p:=q,[p7→a])(t) :=ownτ(t)\{a}, if p ∈ shared∧q ∈ validτ
ownτ.(t,p:=q.next,[p7→a])(t) :=ownτ(t)\{a}, if p ∈ shared∧q,hτ(q).next ∈ validτ
ownτ.(·,p:=q.next,[p 7→a])(t) :=ownτ(t)\{a}, if hτ(q)6∈ownτ(t)∧q,hτ(q).next∈validτ
ownτ.(t,assert p=q, /0)(t) :=ownτ(t)\{hτ(p)}, if p /∈ validτ∨q /∈ validτ
ownτ.act(t) :=ownτ(t), in all other cases.
The first four cases of losing ownership are due to publishing, the last case is due to the
address being compromised by comparing with an invalid pointer.
The following lemma states the intuitive fact that an owned address cannot be
pointed to by a valid shared variable or by a valid local variable of another thread,
since such a configuration can be achieved only by publishing the address.
Lemma 5. Let τ ∈ [[P]]mm and p ∈ validτ with hτ(p) ∈ ownτ(t). Then p ∈ localt.
We now define ownership violations as precisely those situations in which the fact
that an owned address was re-allocated while an invalid pointer was still pointing to it
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influences the computation. Technically, the address is freed or its content is altered due
to an access via a pointer of another thread or a shared pointer.
Definition 8 (Ownership Violation). A computation τ.(t,com,up) ∈ [[P]]mm violates
ownership, if com is one of the following
q.next := p, q.data := x, or q := free,
where hτ(q) ∈ ownτ(t ′) and (t ′ 6= t or q ∈ shared).
The last action of a computation violating ownership is called an ownership violation
and a computation which does not violate ownership respects ownership. We define the
ownership-respecting semantics [[P]]own as those computations of [[P]]mm that respect
ownership. The following lemma shows that SPRF computations respect ownership.
Lemma 6. If τ.(t,com,act) ∈ [[P]]mm violates ownership, then it is an SPR.
The proof of Lemma 6 (c.f. Appendix C) is immediate from Lemma 5 and the def-
initions of ownership violation and strong pointer race. The lemma implies the main
result of this section: the memory-managed semantics coincides with the ownership-
respecting semantics modulo SPRF (c.f. Appendix C).
Theorem 3 (SPRF Guarantee). If [[P]]mm is SPRF, then [[P]]mm = [[P]]own.
4.2 Checking SPRF
This section establishes that checking SPRF may be done in the ownership-respecting
semantics. In other words, if [[P]]mm has an SPR, then there is also one in [[P]]own. This
result, perhaps much less intuitively expected than the symmetrical result of Section 3.2,
is particularly useful for optimizing thread-modular analysis of lock-free programs (cf.
Section 5). Its proof depends on a subtle interplay of ownership and validity.
Let ownpntrsτ be the owning pointers, pointers in hτ to addresses that are owned by
threads and the next fields of addresses owned by threads. To be included in ownpntrsτ,
the pointers have to be valid. A set of pointers O ⊆ ownpntrsτ is coherent if for all
pexp,qexp ∈ ownpntrsτ with the same target or source address (in case of a.next or
a.data) we have pexp ∈ O if and only if qexp ∈ O.
Lemma 7 below establishes the following fact. For every computation that respects
ownership, there is another one that coincides with it but assigns fresh cells to some of
the owning pointers. To be more precise, given a computation τ∈ [[P]]own and a coherent
set of owning pointers O ⊆ ownpntrsτ, we can find another computation τ′ ∈ [[P]]own
where the resulting heap coincides with hτ except for O. These pointers are assigned
fresh addresses. The proof of Lemma 7 is nontrivial and can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 7. Consider τ ∈ [[P]]own SPRF and O ⊆ ownpntrsτ a coherent set. There is
τ′ ∈ [[P]]own and an address mapping fadr : adr(O)→ Adr that satisfy the following:
(1) τ ↓Thrd×Com = τ′ ↓Thrd×Com freedτ ⊆ freedτ′ (4)
(2) hτ|PExp\O = hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O) ownpntrsτ′ = (ownpntrsτ \O) ∪ fexp(O) (5)
(3) hτ|validτ ≡ hτ′ |validτ′ by fadr ∪ id adr(hτ)∩hτ′(fexp(O)) = /0. (6)
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In this lemma, function fadr specifies the new addresses that τ′ assigns to the owning
expressions in O. These new addresses are fresh by Point (6). Point (1) says that τ and
τ′ are the same up to the particular addresses they manipulate, and Point (2) says that
the reached states hτ and hτ′ are the same up to the pointers touched by fadr. Point (3)
states that the valid pointers of hτ stay valid or become valid fexp-images of the originals.
Point (5) says that also the owned pointers of hτ remain the same or become fexp-images
of the originals. Finally, Point (4) says that hτ′ re-allocates less cells.
Lemma 7 is a cornerstone in the proof of the main result in this section, namely that
SPRF is equivalent for the memory-managed and the ownership-respecting semantics.
Theorem 4 (Checking SPRF). [[P]]mm is SPRF if and only if [[P]]own is SPRF.
Proof. If [[P]]mm is SPRF, by [[P]]own ⊆ [[P]]mm this carries over to the ownership-
respecting semantics. For the reverse direction, assume [[P]]mm has an SPR. In this
case, there is a shortest computation τ.act ∈ [[P]]mm where act raises an SPR. In case
τ.act ∈ [[P]]own, we obtain the same SPR in the ownership-respecting semantics.
Assume τ.act /∈ [[P]]own. We first argue that act violates ownership. By prefix clo-
sure, τ ∈ [[P]]mm. By minimality, τ is SPRF. Since ownership violations are SPR by
Lemma 6, τ does not contain any, τ ∈ [[P]]own. Hence, if act respected ownership we
could extend τ to the computation τ.act ∈ [[P]]own — a contradiction to our assumption.
We turn this ownership violation in the memory-managed semantics into an SPR
in the ownership-respecting semantics. To this end, we construct a new computation
τ′.act′ ∈ [[P]]own that mimics τ.act, respects ownership, but suffers from SPR. Since
τ.act is an ownership violation, act takes the form (t,com,up) with com being
q.next := p, q.data := x, or q := free.
Here, hτ(q) ∈ ownτ(t ′) and (t ′ 6= t or q ∈ shared). Since the address is owned, Lemma 5
implies q /∈ validτ.
As a first step towards the new computation, we construct τ′. Let O := ownpntrsτ be
the (coherent) set of all owning pointers in all threads (with q /∈ O). With this choice of
O, we apply Lemma 7. It returns τ′ ∈ [[P]]own with τ′ ↓Thrd×Com = τ ↓Thrd×Com and
hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O) = hτ|PExp\O and hτ′ |validτ′ ≡ hτ|validτ .
Address hτ′(q) is not owned by any thread. This follows from
ownpntrsτ′ = (ownpntrsτ \O) ∪ fexp(O) = fexp(O)
and q 6∈ fexp(O). Finally, q /∈ validτ′ by the isomorphism hτ′ |validτ′ ≡ hτ|validτ .
As a last step, we mimic act = (t,com,up) by an action act′ = (t,com,up′). If com
is q := free, then we free the invalid pointer q /∈ validτ′ and obtain an SPR in [[P]]own.
Assume com is an assignment q.next := p (the case of q.data := x is similar). Since
act is enabled after τ and hτ′(q) = hτ(q), we have hτ′(q) 6= seg. Hence, the command
is also enabled after τ′. Since q /∈ validτ′ , the assignment is again to an invalid pointer.
It is thus an SPR according by Definition 6.(i). uunionsq
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5 Improving Thread-Modular Analyses
We now describe how the theory developed so far can be used to increase the efficiency
of thread-modular analyses of pointer programs under explicit memory management.
Thread-modular reasoning abstracts a program state into a set of states of individual
threads. A thread’s state consists of the local state, the part of the heap reachable from
the local variables, and the shared state, the heap reachable from the shared variables.
The analysis saturates the set of reachable thread states by a fixpoint computation.
Every step in this computation creates new thread states out of the existing ones by
applying the following two rules. (1) Sequential step: a thread’s state is modified by an
action of this thread. (2) Interference: a state of a victim thread is changed by an action
of another, interfering thread. This is accounted for by creating combined two-threads
states from existing pairs of states of the victim and the interferer thread. The states that
are combined have to agree on the shared part. The combined state is constructed by
deciding which addresses in the two local states coincide. It is then observed how an
action of the interferer changes the state of the victim within the combined state.
Pure thread-modular reasoning does not keep any information about what thread
states can appear simultaneously during a computation and what identities can possibly
hold between addresses of local states of threads. This brings efficiency, but also easily
leads to false positives. To see this, consider in Treiber’s stack a state s of a thread that is
just about to perform the cas in push. Variable pnode points to an address a allocated in
the first line of push, pTop, ptop, and pnode.next are at the top of the stack. Consider an
interference step where the states sv of the victim and si of the interferer are isomorphic
to s, with pnode pointing to the newly allocated addresses av and ai, respectively. Since
the shared states conincide, the interference is triggered. The combination must account
for all possible equalities among the local variables. Hence, there is a combined state
with av = ai, which does not occur in reality. This is a crucial imprecision, which leads
to false positives. Namely, the interferer’s cas succeeds, resulting in the new victim’s
state s′v with pTop on ai (which is equal to av). The victim’s cas then fails, and the
thread continues with the commands ptop := pTop;pnode.next := ptop. This results in
av.next pointing back to av, and a loss of the stack content.
Methods based on thread-modular reasoning must prevent such false positives by
maintaining the necessary information about correlations of local states. An efficient
technique commonly used under garbage collection is based on ownership: a thread’s
state records that a has just been allocated and hence no other thread can access the
address, until it enters the shared state. This is enough to prevent false positives such as
the one described above. Namely, the addresses ai and av are owned by the respective
threads and therefore they cannot be equal. Interference may then safely ignore the
problematic case when av = ai. Moreover, besides the increased precision, the ability to
avoid interference steps due to ownership significantly improves the overall efficiency.
This technique was used for instance to prove safety (and linearizability) of Treiber’s
stack and other subtle lock-free algorithms in [16].
Under explicit memory management, ownership of this form cannot be guaranteed.
Addresses can be freed and re-allocated while still being pointed to. Other techniques
must be used to correlate the local states of threads. The solution chosen in [14,1] is to
replace the states of individual threads by states of pairs of threads. Precision is thus
14
restored at the cost of an almost quadratic blow-up of the abstract domain that in turn
manifests itself in a severe decrease of scalability.
5.1 Pointer Race Freedom Saves Ownership
Using the results from Sections 3 and 4, we show how to apply the ownership-based op-
timization of thread-modular reasoning to the memory-managed semantics. To this end,
we split the verification effort into two phases. Depending on the notion of pointer race
freedom, we first check whether the program under scrutiny is (S)PRF. If the check fails,
we report pointer races as potential errors to the developer. If the check succeeds, the
second phase verifies the property of interest (here, linearizability) assuming (S)PRF.
When the notion of PRF from Section 3 is used, the second verification phase can
be performed in the garbage-collected semantics due to Theorem 1. This allows us to
apply the ownership-based optimization discussed above. Moreover, Theorem 2 says
that the first PR has to appear in the garbage-collected semantics. Hence, even the first
phase, checking PRF, can rely on garbage collection and ownership. The PRF check
itself is simple. Validity of pointers is kept as a part of the individual thread states and
updated at every sequential and interference step. Based on this, every computation step
is checked for raising a PR according to Definition 2. Our experiments suggest that the
overhead caused by the recorded validity information is low.
For SPRF, we proceed analogously. Due to the Theorems 3 and 4, checking SPRF
in the first phase and property verification in the second phase can both be done in the
ownership-respecting semantics. The SPRF check is similar to the PRF check. Validity
of pointers together with an information about strong invalidity is kept as a part of a
thread’s state, and every step is checked for raising an SPR according to Definition 6.
The surprising good news is that both phases can again use the ownership-based
optimization. That is, also in the ownership-respecting semantics, interferences on the
owned memory addresses can be skipped. We argue that this is sound. Due to Lemma 5,
if a thread t owns an address a, other threads may access a only via invalid pointers.
Therefore, (1) modifications of a by t need not be considered as an interference step
for other threads. Indeed, if a thread t ′ 6= t was influenced by such a modification (t ′
reads a next or the data field of a), then the corresponding variable of t ′ would become
strongly invalid, Definition 5. Hence, either this variable is never used in an assertion or
in a dereference again (it is effectively dead), or the first use raises an SPR, Cases (ii)
and (iii) in Definition 6. (2) In turn, in the ownership-respecting semantics, another
thread t ′ cannot make changes to a, by Definition 8 of ownership violations. This means
we can also avoid the step where t ′ interferes with the victim t.
5.2 Experimental Results
To substantiate our claim for a more efficient analysis with practical experiments, we
implemented the thread-modular analysis from [1] in a prototype tool. This analysis
is challenging for three reasons: it checks linearizability as a non-trivial requirement,
it handles an unbounded number of threads, and it supports an unbounded heap. Our
tool covers the garbage-collected semantics, the new ownership-respecting semantics of
Section 4, and the memory-managed semantics. For the former two, we use the abstract
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domain where local states refer to single threads. Moreover, we support the ownership-
based pruning of interference steps from Section 5.1. For the memory-managed seman-
tics, to restore precision as discussed above, the abstract domain needs local states with
pairs of threads. Rather than running two phases, our tool combines the PRF check and
the actual analysis. We tested our implementation on lock-free data structures from the
literature and verified linearizability following the approach in [1].
Table 1. Experimental results for thread-modular reasoning using different memory semantics.
Program time in
seconds
explored
state count
sequential
step count
interference
step count
pruned
interferences
correctness
established
Single lock stack
GC 0.053 328 941 3276 10160 yes
OWN 0.21 703 1913 6983 22678 yes
GC− 0.20 507 1243 19321 – yes
OWN− 0.60 950 2474 38117 – yes
MM− 5.34 16117 25472 183388 – yes
Single lock queue
GC 0.034 199 588 738 5718 yes
OWN 0.56 520 1336 734 31200 yes
GC− 0.19 331 778 9539 – yes
OWN− 2.52 790 1963 65025 – yes
MM− 31.7 27499 60263 442306 – yes
Treiber’s lock free
stack (with version
counters) [9]
GC 0.052 269 779 3516 15379 yes
OWN 2.36 744 2637 43261 95398 yes
GC− 0.16 296 837 11530 – yes
OWN− 4.21 746 2158 73478 – yes
MM− 602 116776 322057 7920186 – yes
Michael & Scott’s
lock free queue [9]
(with hints)
GC 2.52 3134 6607 46838 1237012 yes
OWN 10564 19553 43305 6678240 20747559 yes
GC− 9.08 3309 7753 187349 – yes
OWN− 51046 31329 64234 35477171 – yes
MM− aborted ≥69000 ≥90000 – – false positive
The experimental results are listed in Table 1. The experiments were conducted
on an Intel Xeon E5-2650 v3 running at 2.3 GHz. The table includes the following:
(1) runtime taken to establish correctness, (2) number of explored thread states (i.e.
size of the search space), (3) number of sequential steps, (4) number of interference
steps, (5) number of interference steps that have been pruned by the ownership-based
optimization, and (6) the result of the analysis, i.e. whether or not correctness could
be established. For a comparison, we also include the results with the ownership-based
optimization turned off (suffix −). Recall that the optimization does not apply to the
memory-managed semantics. We elaborate on our findings.
Our experiments confirm the usefulness of pointer race freedom. When equipped
with pruning (OWN), the ownership-respecting semantics provides a speed-up of two
orders of magnitude for Treiber’s stack and the single lock data structures compared to
the memory-managed semantics (MM−). The size of the explored state space is close
to the one for the garbage-collected semantics (GC) and up to two orders of magnitude
smaller than the one for explicit memory management. We also stress tested our tool
by purposely inserting pointer races, for example, by discarding the version counters.
In all cases, the tool was able to detect those races.
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For Michael & Scott’s queue we had to provide hints in order to eliminate cer-
tain patterns of false positives. This is due to an imprecision that results from joins
over a large number of states (we are using the joined representation of states from
[1] based on Cartesian abstraction). Those hints are sufficient for the analysis relying
on the ownership-respecting semantics to establish correctness. The memory-manged
semantics produces more false positives, the elimination of which would require more
hinting, as also witnessed by the implementation of [1]. Regarding the stress tests from
above, note that we ran those tests with the same hints and were still able to find the
purposely inserted bugs.
6 Conclusion
We have conducted a semantic study on the relationship between concurrent heap-
manipulating programs running under explicit memory management and under garbage
collection. We proposed the notion of pointer race that captures the difference between
the two semantics and characterizes common synchronizations errors similar to the
well-known data races. We proved that the verification of pointer race free programs
under explicit memory management can be reduced to the easier verification under
garbage collection. We showed an analogous result with a stronger notion of pointer
race proposed to fit performance critical (e.g. lock-free) implementations, which are
intentionally racy in our original sense. Our results are particularly useful in thread-
modular analysis under explicit memory-management. We showed that they allow us to
apply an ownership-based optimization available before only under garbage-collection.
Using this optimization, our prototype was able to verify lock-free algorithms like
Treiber’s stack and Micheal & Scott’s queue for the memory-managed semantics with
a performance gain of up to two orders of magnitude.
References
1. P.A. Abdulla, F. Haziza, L. Holı´k, B. Jonsson, and A. Rezine. An integrated specification
and verification technique for highly concurrent data structures. In TACAS, volume 7795 of
LNCS, pages 324–338. Springer, 2013.
2. S. V. Adve and M. D. Hill. A Unified Formalization of Four Shared-Memory Models. IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 4(6):613–624, 1993.
3. J. Alglave and L. Maranget. Stability in Weak Memory Models. In CAV, volume 6806 of
LNCS, pages 50–66. Springer, 2011.
4. A. Bouajjani, R. Meyer, and E. Mo¨hlmann. Deciding Robustness against Total Store Order-
ing. In ICALP, volume 6756 of LNCS, pages 428–440. Springer, 2011.
5. S. Qadeer C. Flanagan. Thread-modular model checking. In SPIN, pages 213–224, 2003.
6. David L. Detlefs, Paul A. Martin, Mark Moir, and Guy L. Steele, Jr. Lock-free reference
counting. Distrib. Comput., 15(4):255–271, December 2002.
7. A. Gotsman, J. Berdine, B. Cook, and M. Sagiv. Thread-modular shape analysis. In PLDI,
pages 266–277. ACM, 2007.
8. A. Gotsman, N. Rinetzky, and H. Yang. Verifying concurrent memory reclamation algo-
rithms with grace. In ESOP, volume 7792 of LNCS, pages 249–269. Springer, 2013.
9. M. Michael and M. Scott. Nonblocking algorithms and preemption-safe locking on multi-
programmed shared memory multiprocessors. J. Parallel Dist. Comp., 51(1):1–26, 1998.
17
10. Maged M. Michael. Hazard pointers: Safe memory reclamation for lock-free objects. IEEE
Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., 15(6):491–504, June 2004.
11. I. Mijajlovic and H. Yang. Data refinement with low-level pointer operations. In APLAS,
volume 3780 of LNCS, pages 19–36. Springer, 2005.
12. S. Owens. Reasoning about the Implementation of Concurrency Abstractions on x86-TSO.
In ECOOP, volume 6183 of LNCS, pages 478–503. Springer, 2010.
13. R.K.Treiber. Systems Programming: Coping with Parallelism. RJ5118, 1986.
14. M. Segalov, T. Lev-Ami, R. Manevich, G. Ramalingam, and M. Sagiv. Abstract transformers
for thread correlation analysis. In APLAS, LNCS, pages 30–46. Springer, 2009.
15. V. Vafeiadis. Shape-value abstraction for verifying linearizability. In VMCAI, volume 5403
of LNCS, pages 335–348. Springer, 2009.
16. V. Vafeiadis. RGSep action inference. In VMCAI, volume 5944 of LNCS, pages 345–361.
Springer, 2010.
18
A Missing Details
The intended behavior of Treiber’s stack is as follows, see Figure 1. Upon a push, the
corresponding thread allocates a new cell using a local pointer variable pnode and sets
the given value. In a loop, the thread now tries to alter the top of stack. It sets a local
pointer variable ptop to the old top of stack stored in the global pointer variable pTop.
Then it redirects the next selector of pnode to the old top of stack. If no concurrent
execution of a push or a pop has interefered, pTop and ptop still point to the same cell
and the thread atomically sets pTop to pnode. To be precise, the compare-and-swap
command cas atomically checks the equality pTop= ptop and, in case it holds, assigns
to pTop the value of pnode and returns true. If the values differ, the command returns
false. We decided not to add cas to the set of commands to keep our instruction set
small. The theory can be extended to cover cas.
The pop method also creates a local copy ptop of the global top of stack. It checks
whether the stack is empty and, in case, returns negatively. Otherwise, the method
copies the new top of stack ptop.next into the local variable pnode and atomically
moves the global top of stack pTop to pnode. Now the thread executing pop can access
the value of the cell, free ptop, and return.
a
(1) ptop
pTop
pnode
· · · a
(2) ptop†
pTop
pnode
· · · a
(3) ptop†
b
pTop
pnode
· · ·
a
(4)
ptop†
b
pTop
pnode
· · · a
(5) ptop†
b
pTop
pnode
· · ·
Figure 1. ABA-problem in Treiber’s stack.
B Proofs in Section 3
Throughout the appendix, we refer to the two equations for heap isomorphism as com-
patibility requirements.
Proof (of Lemma 1). We consider the first claim. Let h1 ≡ h2 via isoadr : adr(h1)→
adr(h2). Let A := adr(h1|P). The task is to show that iso′adr := isoadr|A : A→ isoadr(A)
defines an isomorphism between h1|P and h2|isoexp(P). To this end, it is sufficient to
show that iso′adr induces a bijection iso
′
exp between dom(h1|P) and dom(h2|isoexp(P)) that
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satisfies the compatibility requirements for an isomorphism. From this we derive that
iso′adr is a bijection between the addresses.
Function iso′exp is total since iso′adr maps all addresses in dom(pval1|P)∩Adr and
in dom(dval1|D)∩ Adr. The function is injective as isoexp is. In the case of pointer
expressions, surjectivity means for every qexp ∈ dom(pval2|isoexp(P)) there is pexp ∈
dom(pval1|P) with isoexp(pexp) = qexp. Since qexp ∈ dom(pval2|isoexp(P)), we have
qexp ∈ dom(pval2). Since isoadr is a heap isomorphism, there is pexp ∈ dom(pval1)
with isoexp(pexp) = qexp. Moreover, since qexp ∈ isoexp(P), we have pexp ∈ P. To-
gether, pexp ∈ dom(pval1|P). Surjectivity for data expressions is similar. The compati-
bility required for an isomorphism holds as it holds for isoexp.
Consider now the second claim and assume a ∈ adr(h1) but b /∈ adr(h1). Let isoadr be
the isomorphism between h1 and h2. We extend the function by b 7→ b′ and restrict it to
the new domain adr(h1[a.next 7→ b]). Note that we indeed may lose the address that
a.next was pointing to so that a restriction is necessary:
iso′adr := (isoadr ∪{b 7→ b′})|adr(h1[a.next7→b]).
We first check that iso′adr is a function. This holds as b /∈ adr(h1) = dom(isoadr). To
show that iso′adr is a bijection between the addresses, it is again sufficient to show that
the induced function on pointer and data expressions iso′exp is a bijection satisfying
the requirements for an isomorphism. The induced function is total as iso′adr maps all
addresses in adr(h1[a.next 7→ b]). In particular does iso′adr extend isoadr and hence
map adr(h1) containing a. The induced function is injective essentially as isoexp is. To
be precise, if a.next was not in the domain of h1, then isoadr(a).next was not in the
domain of h2 since isoexp is a bijection. We can therefore safely add this mapping. It
remains to show that the function is surjective. Consider qexp ∈ dom(h2[a′.next 7→ b′])
with a′ = isoadr(a). If qexp = a′.next, then qexp = iso′exp(a.next). If we have qexp ∈
dom(h2) \ {a′.next}, then there is pexp ∈ dom(h1) so that qexp = isoexp(pexp). This
pexp exists as isoexp is a bijection between the old domains.
To check the compatibility requirements, let pval1 be the pointer valuation in
h1[a.next 7→ b] and let pval2 be the valuation in h2[a′.next 7→ b′]. Then
iso′adr(pval1(a.next)) = iso
′
adr(b)
= b′
= pval2(a
′.next) = pval2(iso
′
exp(a.next)).
For the remaining pointers, the requirement holds by the fact that isoadr was a heap
isomorphism. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 2). Assume a ∈ freedτ. To show that a /∈ adr(hτ|validτ), we show that
(i) no pointer pexp to a is valid (in validτ) and (ii) no selector a.next is valid. Since
the restriction hτ|validτ only keeps selectors a.data for valid pointers to a, Argument (i)
also removes a from dom(dvalτ).
For (i), we show that hτ(pexp) = a implies pexp /∈ validτ. Since a∈ freedτ, there was
no malloc after the free of the address. Hence, there are two cases. Either pexp learned
about a before or after the address was freed. In the former case, pexp is invalidated
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by the free of address a. In the latter case, pexp can only learn about a from an invalid
pointer. This renders pexp invalid, too.
We show (ii), all selectors a.next are invalid. These selectors were declared invalid
at the moment address a was freed. The only way to validate a.next is via an assign-
ment to it. This assignment is forbidden as computation τ is assumed to be PRF. Indeed,
with Argument (i), all pointers to a are invalid and hence accessing the next selector will
result in a pointer race according to Definition 2(i). uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 3). We proceed by induction. In the base case, all pointers are valid
and there is nothing to prove. Assume the claim holds for σ and consider σ.act ∈ [[P]]gc
PRF. The main task is to carefully consider the assignments. There are five cases.
Case p.next := q Let hσ(p) = a 6= seg. We have a 6= seg by enabledness.
(1) If q is invalid, it points to b 6= seg by the induction hypothesis(i). If p was valid,
claim(ii) now holds for a.next.
(2) If q is valid pointing to b which may be seg, then a.next will be valid. If b 6=
seg, the next selectors of b behave as required by the induction hypothesis(ii)
on q. If b = seg, claim(ii) is trivial for a.next.
Case p := q
(3) If q is invalid, it points to a 6= seg by the induction hypothesis(i). This proves
claim(i) for p.
(4) If q is valid, then p will become valid. If hσ(q) = seg, claim(ii) trivially holds
for p. If hσ(q) = b 6= seg, the statement about the invalid next selectors of b
carries over to p by the induction hypothesis(ii) on q.
Case p := q.next Let hσ(q) = b 6= seg. Again, we have b 6= seg by enabledness.
(5) If q is invalid, this is again a pointer race.
(6) This means q is valid. If hσ(b.next) = seg, by the induction hypothesis(ii)
expression b.next has to be valid. Then p becomes valid and points to seg. In
this case, claim(ii) trivially holds. Otherwise, hσ(b.next) = c 6= seg. If b.next
is invalid, p becomes invalid and claim(i) holds. If b.next is valid, claim(ii)
about the next selectors of c holds for p by the induction hypothesis(ii) on
b.next.
Consider a free command p := free with hσ(p) = a 6= seg. This invalidates all pointers
to a and claim(i) and claim(ii) hold.
Consider a malloc p := malloc. This returns a fresh cell f where all next selectors
f .next are valid. Hence, claim(ii) trivially holds. uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 1). We proceed by induction on the length of τ. The base case of
single actions setting data variables to arbitrary values is trivial. In the induction step,
assume for τ we have the heap-equivalent computation σ. The fact that the sequences
of commands coincide for τ and σ means we can assume the resulting control states to
coincide. This allows us to always choose the same next command in both semantics.
We therefore focus on the heap content and do a case distinction along the transition
rule that leads to τ′. In the following, let isoadr : adr(hτ|validτ)→ adr(hσ|validσ) be the
isomorphism between hτ|validτ and hσ|validσ .
Case (Malloc2) Let τ′ = τ.(t,p := malloc, [p 7→ a]) with a ∈ freedτ. It can be shown
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that the value of a.data is defined for addresses a that have been freed. Let it be
hτ(a.data) = d. We now have
hτ′ |validτ′ = hτ[p 7→ a]|validτ∪{p}
= (hτ|validτ)[p 7→ a,a.data 7→ d]. (17)
The first equation is by the definition of τ′ and validτ′ . To understand the second
equation, note that a /∈ adr(hτ|validτ) by a ∈ freedτ and Lemma 2. This means in
hτ[p 7→ a]|validτ∪{p}, pointer p is the only reference to a. Since we have a reference
to a, value a.data is defined in hτ[p 7→ a]|validτ∪{p}. So if we push the restriction over
the update, we have to preserve definedness of a.data. Therefore, we add a.data 7→ d
to the update.
To mimic the command with garbage collection, we apply Rule (Mal-
loc1) and get σ′ := σ.(t,p := malloc, [p 7→ f , f .data 7→ d,{ f .next 7→ seg |
for every selector next}]). Note that we allocate a fresh address f /∈ adr(hσ). The tran-
sition rule allows us to select an arbitrary value. We choose the value of a.data in hτ.
The next selectors are yet undefined. We have
hσ′ |validσ′ = hσ[p 7→ f , f .data 7→ d,{ f .next 7→ seg | for every next}]|validσ∪{p}
= (hσ|validσ)[p 7→ f , f .data 7→ d]. (18)
The first equation is again by the definition of σ′ and of validσ′ . The second equation
preserves the assignments p 7→ f and f .data 7→ d. Since we overwrite the value of p,
there is no need to keep p with the valid pointers when we push the restriction inside.
Since f is fresh, the pointers f .next are not contained in validσ. The restriction removes
the corresponding assignments to seg.
To see that hτ′ |validτ′ and hσ′ |validσ′ are isomorphic, we first note that
hτ|validτ ≡ hσ|validσ
by the induction hypothesis. We already argued for a /∈ adr(hτ|validτ). Similarly, f /∈
adr(hσ|validσ). This allows us to apply Lemma 1(15), more precisely a variant of
Case (15) where the next pointer is replaced by p:
(hτ|validτ)[p 7→ a]≡ (hσ|validσ)[p 7→ f ].
The isomorphism for this new heap maps a to f . This allows us to apply Lemma 1(16)
and get
(hτ|validτ)[p 7→ a][a.data 7→ d]≡ (hσ|validσ)[p 7→ f ][ f .data 7→ d].
With Equations (17) and (18), this is the desired
hτ′ |validτ′ ≡ hσ′ |validσ′ .
Case (Free) Let τ′ = τ.(t,p := free, /0). Since τ′ is assumed to be PRF, we get p ∈
validτ. The more complex case is that hτ(p) = a 6= seg. The pointers that remain valid
after the free are
validτ′ = validτ \ invalida.
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Recall that invalida := {pexp | hτ(pexp) = a}∪{a.next1, . . . ,a.nextn}. Then
hτ′ |validτ′ = hτ|validτ\invalida (19)
To mimic the command with garbage collection, we also free pointer p in σ and ob-
tain σ′ := σ.(t,p := free, /0). Since p is defined in hτ|validτ , heap isomorphism requires
pvalσ(p) = isoadr(pvalτ(p)) = isoadr(a) 6= seg. We have isoadr(a) 6= seg as a 6= seg
and isoadr is an address mapping.
The pointers that remain valid after the free are
validσ′ = validσ \ invalidisoadr(a).
As in the case of τ′, we obtain
hσ′ |validσ′ = hσ|validσ\invalidisoadr(a) . (20)
For the isomorphism, we first show that
isoexp(validτ \ invalida) = validσ \ invalidisoadr(a). (21)
To prove the inclusion from left to right, consider isoexp(pexp) with pexp ∈ validτ and
pexp /∈ invalida. Since pexp ∈ validτ, we have that isoexp(pexp) ∈ validσ. This holds
since isoexp defines a bijection between dom(hτ|validτ) and dom(hσ|validσ). To see that
isoexp(pexp) /∈ invalidisoadr(a), assume for the sake of contradiction that it was in the
set. This either means isoexp(pexp) points to isoadr(a) or it is a selector of isoadr(a).
Consider the former case. Then we have
isoadr(a) = hσ(isoexp(pexp)) = isoadr(hτ(pexp)).
The second equation holds by the fact that isoadr is a heap isomorphism. Together, we
get hτ(pexp) = a. This contradicts the fact that pexp /∈ invalida. The reverse inclusion is
along similar lines.
We establish the desired isomorphism as follows:
hτ′ |validτ′
Equation (19) = hτ|validτ\invalida
= (hτ|validτ)|validτ\invalida
Ind. hypothesis, Equation (21), Lemma 1(14)≡ (hσ|validσ)|validσ\invalidisoadr(a)
= hσ|validσ\invalidisoadr(a)
Equation (20) = hσ′ |validσ′ .
Case (Asgn) valid Consider τ′ = τ.(t,p.next := q, [a.next 7→ b]). Since the assign-
ment is enabled, we have hτ(p) = a 6= seg. Since the computation is PRF, we have
p∈ validτ. Pointer q has value hτ(q) = b, which may be seg. Assume q∈ validτ. In this
case, we have
validτ′ = validτ∪{a.next}
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and hence
hτ′ |validτ′ = hτ[a.next 7→ b]|validτ∪{a.next}
= (hτ|validτ)[a.next 7→ b]. (22)
The first equality is by definition of τ′ and validτ′ . The second equality uses the fact that
q is valid and points to b. This means we preserve b.data in hτ|validτ (provided b 6= seg)
and only have to adapt the mapping of a.next. The situation may be contrasted with
the case of (Malloc2) where we had to maintain a.data.
To mimic the command, observe that hτ(p) = a 6= seg, p ∈ validτ, and hτ|validτ ≡
hσ|validσ . Together, this yields hσ(p) = isoadr(a) 6= seg and allows us to dereference the
address. Again due to isomorphism, q has to be valid in σ and hσ(q) = isoadr(b). We
thus get σ′ := σ.(t,p.next := q, [isoadr(a).next 7→ isoadr(b)]).
By definition,
validσ′ = validσ∪{isoadr(a).next}
and with the same argument as for τ′
hσ′ |validσ′ = hσ[isoadr(a).next 7→ isoadr(b)]|validσ∪{isoadr(a).next}
= (hσ|validσ)[isoadr(a).next 7→ isoadr(b)]. (23)
The desired isomorphism hτ′ |validτ′ ≡ hσ′ |validσ′ now follows with Lemma 1(15) in com-
bination with the above Equations (22) and (23).
Case (Asgn) invalid Let τ′ = τ.(t,p.next := q, [a.next 7→ b]). As in the previous
case, by enabledness hτ(p) = a 6= seg and by PRF p ∈ validτ. Again hτ(q) = b may be
seg. We now assume q /∈ validτ. This gives
validτ′ = validτ \{a.next}.
As a result, we have
hτ′ |validτ′ = hτ[a.next 7→ b]|validτ\{a.next}
= hτ|validτ\{a.next}. (24)
The first equality is by definition. For the second equality, note that a.next may already
be defined in hτ. Therefore, we have to remove the pointer explicitly also from this
heap.
To mimic the command, we again deduce hσ(p) = isoadr(a) 6= seg. Since q is not
valid in τ, it cannot be valid in σ due to the isomorphism between hτ|validτ and hσ|validσ .
Let the value be hσ(q) = c. We thus obtain the computation σ′ := σ.(t,p.next :=
q, [isoadr(a).next 7→ c]).
Like in the case of τ, we have
validσ′ = validσ \{isoadr(a).next}
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and hence
hσ′ |validσ′ = hσ[isoadr(a).next 7→ c]|validσ\{isoadr(a).next}
= hσ|validσ\{isoadr(a).next}. (25)
We derive the desired isomorphism with Lemma 1(14) in combination with Equa-
tions (24) and (25):
hτ′ |validτ′
Equation (24) = hτ|validτ\{a.next}
= (hτ|validτ)|validτ\{a.next}
Ind. hypothesis, Lemma 1(14)≡ (hσ|validσ)|validσ\{isoadr(a).next}
= hσ|validσ\{isoadr(a).next}
Equation (25) = hσ′ |validσ′ .
uunionsq
Proof (of Theorem 2). The implication from left to right is due to the fact that [[P]]mm ⊇
[[P]]gc. For the reverse implication, we assume [[P]]mm has a pointer race and from this
construction a pointer race in [[P]]gc. If the memory-managed semantics has a pointer
race, then it has a shortest one. Let it be τ.act ∈ [[P]]mm with act an access to an in-
valid pointer. We remove act and obtain τ ∈ [[P]]mm. Membership holds as the memory-
managed semantics is prefix-closed. As τ is shorter than τ.act, it is PRF. This allows
us to apply Proposition 1: There is a computation σ ∈ [[P]]gc in the garbage-collected
semantics with σ≈ τ. Note that σ is again PRF by minimality of τ.act and σ ∈ [[P]]mm.
By definition of heap equivalence, the commands in τ and σ coincide. This means
they lead to the same control location. So the two semantics are, up to enabledness,
ready to execute the same next command. We moreover have hτ|validτ ≡ hσ|validσ . We
now show how to mimic act in the garbage-collected semantics in a way that also raises
a pointer race.
Case Free Let act=(t,p := free, /0). Since τ.act is a pointer race, we have p /∈ validτ.
Since isoexp defines a bijection between the pointers in hτ|validτ and in hσ|validσ , we
conclude that p /∈ validσ. This means computation
σ.(t,p := free, /0) ∈ [[P]]gc .
is also a pointer race — as required.
Case Assignment Let act = (t,com,up) where com is q := p.next with p /∈ validτ.
As before, we conclude that p /∈ validσ. With Lemma 3(i), we obtain hσ(p) = a 6= seg.
This means we are able to dereference the address and can execute command com in
the garbage-collected semantics:
σ.(t,com,up′) ∈ [[P]]gc .
The update may differ due to the use of invalid pointers. However, the computation will
again use p.next and, since p /∈ validσ, will again be racy.
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Case Assertion Let act = (t,assert cond, /0) where cond contains p with p /∈ validτ.
As before, we derive p /∈ validσ. We are not guaranteed that the valuations in hσ and
in hτ coincide. The definition of programs, however, ensures assert commands have
complements. This means if assert cond is not enabled after σ, then assert ¬cond
will be ready for execution. We thus have
σ.(t,assert (¬)cond, /0) ∈ [[P]]gc .
Since condition cond coincides, it will again make use of p with p /∈ validσ. This means
the computation is again racy. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 4). If a ∈ freedσ, then the pointers to it cannot be valid by Lemma 2.
Assume that a /∈ freedσ. In the presence of garbage collection, the set freedσ mono-
tonically increases as σ gets longer. This means a has not been freed throughout the
computation. We now show that there cannot be an invalid pointer to a. There are two
ways of creating an invalid pointer to a: Either by assigning it an invalid pointer pexp
or by freeing the address. In particular would the first (in a shortest prefix) invalid pexp
have to stem from a free on a. Since the address has never seen a free, there is no invalid
pointer to it. uunionsq
Proposition 2 follows from the following characterization of PRF under garbage collec-
tion.
Lemma 8. [[P]]gc is PRF if and only if there is no σ1.act1.σ2.act2 ∈ [[P]]gc so that
com(act1) is p := free with hσ1(p) = a 6= seg and com(act2) involves q.next,q.data,
q := free, or is an assertion with q, and hσ1.act1.σ2(q) = a.
Proof (of Lemma 8). For the only-if, we show the contrapositive. Note that a ∈
freedσ1.act1.σ2 by monotonicity of freedσ under garbage collection. With hσ1.act1.σ2(q) =
a and Lemma 4, we conclude q /∈ validσ1.act1.σ2 . Moreover, pointer variable q is used in
a way that raises a pointer race.
For the if-direction, we again reason by contraposition. Consider a shortest pointer
race σ.act ∈ [[P]]gc. Then there is an invalid pointer q /∈ validσ that is used in act in a
way that raises a pointer race. Since computation σ is shorter than σ.act, it is PRF. By
Lemma 3(i), we have hσ(q) = a 6= seg. By Lemma 4, we conclude that a has been freed
somewhere in σ. uunionsq
C Proofs in Section 4
Proof (of Lemma 5 (Sketch)). We show the contrapositive and assume that hτ(p) ∈
ownτ(t) but (i) p ∈ shared or (ii) p ∈ localt′ with t ′ 6= t. From this we derive p /∈ validτ.
Consider Case (i). If the owning thread had passed the address via a valid pointer to p
(potentially transitively via other public pointers, but we refrain from doing this case
distinction), then t would have lost ownership of the cell. As a consequence, either (i.i)
t never passed the address to p or (i.ii) it did so via an invalid pointer or an invalid
next selector. In the former Case (i.i), p is a dangling pointer to a cell that has been
re-allocated, which in particular means p /∈ validτ. In the latter Case (i.ii), the invalid
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right-hand side pt of the assignment p := pt will have rendered p invalid. Consider now
Case (ii). We note that threads do not assign their local pointers to the local pointers
of other threads. Therefore, the only way t ′ could point to an owned cell of t is by
(ii.i) being a dangling pointer or (ii.ii) having received the reference from a shared
pointer. In the former Case (ii.i), we immediately have p /∈ validτ like in Case (i.i). In
the latter Case (ii.ii), the argumentation from Case (i) shows that the shared pointer has
to be invalid. As a consequence, also p that receives the content of the shared pointer
becomes invalid. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 6). If τ.(t,com,act) ∈ [[P]]mm violates ownership, then com is an as-
signment as in Definition 8. Let the variable be q with hτ(q) ∈ ownτ(t ′) and (t ′ 6= t or
q∈ shared). By Lemma 5, the pointer cannot be valid, q /∈ validτ. Combined, we obtain
the definition of SPR, Definition 6.(i). uunionsq
Proof (of Theorem 3). The ownership-respecting semantics [[P]]own is a subset of the
memory-managed semantics [[P]]mm, so the inclusion from right to left holds without
precondition. For the reverse inclusion, assume [[P]]mm is not included in [[P]]own. Then
there is τ ∈ [[P]]mm that violates ownership. By Lemma 6, τ is an SPR. This contradicts
[[P]]mm SPRF. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 7). We proceed by induction on the length of the computation. In
the base case, we have single actions that set data variables arbitrarily. We mimic them
identically. In the induction step, consider the SPRF computation τ.act ∈ [[P]]own and
assume we are given O⊆ ownpntrsτ.act. We invoke the induction hypothesis depending
on act. Since we will always execute the same command, Requirement (1) will trivially
hold and we rephrain from commenting on it.
Case (Malloc2) Consider act=(t,p := malloc, [p 7→ a]), which means we re-allocate
an address that has been freed. With this assignment, address a is owned by thread t and
p is an owning pointer, a ∈ ownτ.act(t) and ownpntrsτ.act = ownpntrsτ ∪{p}. Since we
only turn p into an owning pointer, we can safely use O′ := O \ {p} ⊆ ownpntrsτ to
invoke the induction hypothesis for τ. The hypothesis returns a computation τ′. Since
the sequences of commands coindice for τ and for τ′, the threads reach the same control
locations and hence also in τ′ thread t is ready to execute a malloc. The result of the
allocation will depend on whether or not p belongs to the given set O:
p /∈ O We again allocate the address a with (Malloc2). The transition is enabled after τ′
by a∈ freedτ ⊆ freedτ′ . It remains to check (2) to (6). Concerning Requirement (2),
the only pointer outside O that we change is p, and we set it consistently to a in
both τ.act and in τ′.act. The isomorphism in Requirement (3) is also fine by
hτ.act ↓validτ.act = (hτ[p 7→ a]) ↓validτ∪{p}
= (hτ ↓validτ)[p 7→ a,a.data 7→ d]
≡ (hτ′ ↓validτ′ )[p 7→ a,a.data 7→ d]
= (hτ′ [p 7→ a]) ↓validτ′∪{p}
= hτ′.act ↓validτ′.act
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where we preserve a.data as in Proposition 1. For Requirement (4), we consistently
remove a from the set of freed addresses in τ.act and in τ′.act. For the owning
pointers in Requirement (5) we have
ownpntrsτ′.act = ownpntrsτ′ ∪{p}
= (ownpntrsτ \O′) ∪ fexp(O′)∪{p}
= ((ownpntrsτ∪{p})\O) ∪ fexp(O)
= (ownpntrsτ.act \O) ∪ fexp(O).
The first equation is by definition, the second is the hypothesis for τ and O′, the third
equation holds by O′=O as p is assumed not to belong to O, and the last equation is
again by definition. Concerning freshness of the owning pointers, Requirement (6),
we note O′ = O. This gives
hτ′.act(fexp(O)) = hτ′ [p 7→ a](fexp(O′)) = hτ′(fexp(O′)).
The latter equality is because p /∈ O′ and hence p /∈ fexp(O′). We have p /∈ fexp(O′)
as only fexp(p) = p. Moreover, adr(hτ.act) = adr(hτ)∪ {a} = adr(hτ). The latter
equality holds because a.data is defined in hτ and we re-allocate the address. The
hypothesis, adr(hτ)∩hτ′(fexp(O′)) = /0, combined with the previous argumentation
yields adr(hτ.act)∩hτ′.act(fexp(O)) = /0.
p ∈ O We allocate a fresh address using (Malloc1) and act′ = (t,p := malloc,up)
with up = [p 7→ b,b.data 7→ d,{b.next 7→ seg | for every selector next}]. Re-
quirement (2) holds as we only change a pointer in O. Requirement (3) is as in
the proof of Proposition 1. Requirement (4) holds by
freedτ.act = freedτ \{a} ⊆ freedτ′ = freedτ′.act′ ,
where the inclusion is due to the hypothesis.
Concerning the address mapping, we set it to fadr unionmulti{a 7→ b}. It remains to check
that this is a function, which means a /∈ dom(fadr) = adr(O). We have a ∈ freedτ,
hence there is no valid pointer to this address and no valid next selector defined
at this address by Lemma 2. Since all pointers in O are valid, the claim follows.
Actually, Lemma 2 assumes the computation to be PRF, but an inspection of the
proof shows that it continues to hold for SPRF computations.
For Requirement (5), we have
ownpntrsτ′.act′ = ownpntrsτ′ ∪{p}
= (ownpntrsτ \O′)∪ fexp(O′)∪{p}
= (ownpntrsτ \O′)∪ fexp(O)
= (ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O).
The first equation is by definition, the second invokes the hypothesis for τ and O′.
The third equation uses the fact that fexp(p) = p. In the last equation, we add p
to ownpntrsτ and O
′. For Requirement (6), adr(hτ.act) = adr(hτ)∪{a} = adr(hτ).
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The latter equation holds because a is re-allocated and thus a.data is defined in hτ.
Moreover, we have
hτ′.act′(fexp(O)) = hτ′ [p 7→ b](fexp(O)) = hτ′(fexp(O′))∪{b}.
An application of the induction hypothesis gives adr(hτ)∩hτ′(fexp(O′)) = /0. Since
b is fresh, the required disjointness adr(hτ.act)∩hτ′.act(fexp(O)) = /0 holds.
Case (Malloc1) Consider the case that p allocates a fresh address a using (Malloc1).
Like in the previous case, we invoke the induction hypothesis for τ with O′ := O\{p}
and obtain τ′. We can safely assume that a has not been allocated in τ′. Indeed, in cases
where τ′ deviates from τ, it can allocate fresh addresses different from a. We mimic the
allocation of p in τ′ with another invocation to (Malloc1). Depending on whether p /∈O
or p ∈ O, the mimicking allocation also selects a or it selects a fresh b, respectively.
If p ∈ O, the address mapping is extended by a 7→ b. The Requirements (2) to (4) are
immediate. Requirement (5) is checked like in the previous case. Requirement (6) is by
the induction hypothesis and the fact that b is chosen fresh.
Case (Free) Consider act = (t,p := free, /0). We note that O ⊆ ownpntrsτ since
ownpntrsτ.act = ownpntrsτ \ invalidhτ(p). This allows us to invoke the hypothesis and
obtain the computation τ′. After τ′ we are ready to execute the same action act as in
the computation τ. To establish τ′.act ∈ [[P]]own, we have to show that the computation
respects ownership. Towards a contradiction, assume hτ′(p) ∈ ownt′(τ′) with t ′ 6= t or p
shared. With Lemma 5, we have that p cannot be valid in τ′. Since the valid pointers in
τ and τ′ coincide by Requirement (3) in the induction hypothesis, we have that p was
not valid in τ. But this in turn means that action act frees an invalid pointer in τ, which
raises an SPR. A contradiction to the assumption that τ.act is SPRF.
It remains to check the guarantees (2) to (6) required by the induction. For Require-
ment (2) note that p := free does not execute any updates. Hence hτ.act(=)hτ() and
similarly for τ′. Hence it remains to apply the induction hypothesis as follows:
hτ.act |PExp\O = hτ|PExp\O
= hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O)
= hτ′.act |PExp\fexp(O).
Requirement (3) is like in Proposition 1. For Requirement (4), note that the induction
hypothesis guarantees hτ(p) = hτ′(p) because p /∈ O. Moreover, the hypothesis gives
freedτ ⊆ freedτ′ . Together, this yields
freedτ.act = freedτ∪{hτ(p)} ⊆ freedτ′ ∪{hτ′(p)}= freedτ′.act.
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Concerning Property (5), we note that
ownpntrsτ′.act = ownpntrsτ′ \ invalidhτ′ (p)
= ((ownpntrsτ \O)∪ fexp(O))\ invalidhτ′ (p)
= ((ownpntrsτ \O)∪ fexp(O))\ invalidhτ(p)
= ((ownpntrsτ \O)\ invalidhτ(p))∪ fexp(O)
= ((ownpntrsτ \ invalidhτ(p))\O)∪ fexp(O)
= (ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O).
The first equality is by the definition of owning pointer, more precisely, the requirement
that they have to be valid. The second equation is the induction hypothesis for τ and O.
For the third equality, we show invalidhτ(p) = invalidhτ′ (p). We argue for⊆. We have
p /∈ O. Since O is chosen coherent, for every other pointer pexp = q or pexp = a.next
to hτ(p), we have pexp /∈ O. With the induction hypothesis, Requirement (2), all these
pointers pexp are mapped identically,
hτ′(pexp) = hτ(pexp) = hτ(p) = hτ′(p).
So pexp ∈ invalidhτ′ (p). For the next pointers hτ(p).next that are turned invalid by the
free in τ, membership in invalidhτ′ (p) is by hτ(p) = hτ′(p). For the reverse inclusion ⊇,
we argue towards a contradiction and assume that it does not hold. Certainly, every next
pointer hτ′(p).next is also in invalidhτ(p) by hτ′(p) = hτ(p). So there is a pointer pexp
to hτ′(p) that is not in invalidhτ(p). Since by the hypothesis, Requirement (2), the heaps
coincide except for O and fexp(O), this other pointer has to belong to fexp(O). But then
pexp cannot point to hτ′(p) = hτ(p), because the address also belongs to adr(hτ). This
would violate Requirement (6) in the induction hypothesis.
For the fourth equation, we argue that fexp(O)∩ invalidhτ(p) = /0. Assume there was
a pointer pexp ∈ fexp(O) with pexp ∈ invalidhτ(p). Then pexp points to hτ(p) or it has
the shape hτ(p).next. In both cases, pexp /∈ O since p /∈ O and O is chosen coherent.
In the former case, we get hτ′(pexp) = hτ(pexp) by Requirement (2) in the hypothesis.
This contradicts the disjointness in Requirement (6) in the hypothesis. In the latter case,
we have hτ′(p) = hτ(p), and hence hτ(p) ∈ hτ′(fexp(O)) also violates the disjointness in
Requirement (6) in the induction hypothesis.
The fifth equation is set theory. The last equation is the definition of the set of
owning pointers.
Requirement (6) follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that the free
does not change the heap.
Case (Asgn) owned Consider an assignment act = (t,p.next := q, [a.next 7→ b]).
We consider the case that a.next ∈ O. To invoke the hypothesis, we choose the largest
coherent subset O′ ⊆ O with O′ ⊆ ownpntrsτ. Let the resulting computation be τ′.
As a first step, we argue that q∈O′. We have ownpntrsτ.act = ownpntrsτ∪{a.next}.
Hence, O′=O\{a.next} if hτ(a.next) is not the target or source address of a pointer in
O, and O′ = O otherwise. We have q ∈ O since hτ.act(q) = hτ.act(a.next), a.next ∈ O,
and O is coherent. Moreover, q ∈ ownpntrsτ, for otherwise a.next would not have
become an owning pointer to b after the assignment. Hence, q ∈ O′.
30
To mimic the command, note that by the induction hypothesis we are in the
same control state and thus ready to execute the assigment. To make sure the assign-
ment is enabled, we check that hτ′(p) 6= seg. This holds by the hypothesis, Require-
ments (2) and (3). Indeed, if p /∈ O′, then the address is mapped identically, and we get
hτ′(p) = a= hτ(p). If p∈O′, then the address is mapped by fadr. Since fadr is an address
mapping, it only maps seg to seg, and hence a 6= seg to hτ′(p) = fadr(a) 6= seg. With
this argument, we obtain τ′.act′ with act′ := (t,p.next := q, [hτ′(p) 7→ fadr(b)]).
To establish τ′.act′ ∈ [[P]]own, we have to show that the assignment in act′ respects
ownership. Towards a contradiction, assume hτ′(p) ∈ ownt′(τ′) with t ′ 6= t or p shared.
By Lemma 5, p cannot be valid in τ′. Since the valid pointers in τ′ and in τ coincide,
Requirement (3) in the induction hypothesis, p cannot be valid in τ. By Definition 6, the
assignment p.next := q would raise an SPR — in contradiction to the assumption that
τ.act is SPRF.
We now show that the new computation satisfies the Requirements (2) to (6). For
Requirement (2), we obtain equality by the induction hypothesis. Indeed, we may only
add a.next to O if it did not belong to O′ before the assignment. Requirement (3) is as
in Proposition 1. The freed addresses do not change by the assignment, therefore, for
Requirement (4) there is nothing to do. For Requirement (5), we note that
ownpntrsτ′.act′ = ownpntrsτ′ ∪{hτ′(p).next}
= (ownpntrsτ \O′)∪ fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}.
There are two cases. Assume O′ = O or, phrased differently, hτ(p).next ∈O′. Then we
have hτ′(p).next ∈ fexp(O′) by Requirement (2) in the hypothesis. Thus,
(ownpntrsτ \O′)∪ fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}
=((ownpntrsτ∪{hτ(p).next})\ (O′∪{hτ(p).next})) ∪ fexp(O′)
=(ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O).
The first equation is set theory and the fact that hτ′(p).next ∈ fexp(O′). The second
equation is by definition of ownpntrsτ.act, the fact that hτ(p).next ∈O′, and by O′ = O.
Assume O′ = O \ {hτ(p).next}. For the induction step, we update fadr by map-
ping hτ(p) identically. We have hτ′(p) = hτ(p), for otherwise p ∈ O′ and by coherence
hτ(p).next ∈ O′. From this, we derive
(ownpntrsτ \O′)∪ fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}
=((ownpntrsτ∪{hτ(p).next})\ (O′∪{hτ(p).next}))∪ fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}
=(ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}
=(ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O).
We have fexp(O′)∪{hτ′(p).next}= fexp(O′)∪{hτ(p).next}= fexp(O) by the choice of
the address function. Requirement (6) is easier to check.
Case (Asgn) not owned Consider an assignment act = (t,p.next := q, [a.next 7→
b]). Assume p.next 6∈ O. Since O is coherent for τ.act, we also have q 6∈ O. We invoke
the induction hypothesis for τ with O. We can do so since O is also coherent for τ by
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the definition of owned addresses. The hypothesis yields some τ′ ∈ [[P]]own and some
address mapping fadr satisfying Requirements (1) to (6).
First, we argue that act is enabled after τ′. Therefore, we have to show that hτ′(q) 6=
seg. The argument is as in the previous case ((Asgn) owned). We can now establish
Requirements (2) to (6).
Requirement (2) follows from p.next 6∈ O, q 6∈ O, fexp(p.next) 6∈ fexp(O), fexp(q) 6∈
fexp(O) and the induction hypothesis. Hence, we can derive the following:
hτ.act |PExp\O = hτ[a.next 7→ b]|PExp\O
= hτ|PExp\O[a.next 7→ b]
= hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O)[a.next 7→ b]
= hτ′ [a.next 7→ b]|PExp\fexp(O)
= hτ′.act |PExp\fexp(O).
Requirement (3) is as in Proposition 1. The freed addresses do not change by the as-
signment, therefore, Requirement (4) holds, too. For Requirement (5), we observe that
ownpntrsτ.act = ownpntrsτ∪X with X = ownpntrsτ.act \ownpntrsτ, by the definition of
ownership. The analogue holds for ownpntrsτ′.act. Moreover, X ∩O = /0. Hence, we can
establish Requirement (5) as follows:
ownpntrsτ′.act = ownpntrsτ′ ∪X
= (ownpntrsτ \O)∪ fexp(O)∪X
= ((ownpntrsτ∪X)\O)∪ fexp(O)
= (ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O).
Requirement (6) follows from the fact that p.next 6∈ fexp(O).
Case (Asrt) Consider act = (t,assert p = q, /0) with hτ(p) = a. By enabledness we
have a = b∨a = seg∨b = seg. We invoke the induction hypothesis on τ with O. This
yields some τ′ ∈ [[P]]own and some address mapping fadr satisfying Requirements (1)
to (6).
We now prove that act is enabled in τ′, i.e. τ′.act ∈ [[P]]own. Towards a contradiction,
assume that act is not enabled in τ′. Therefore, let hτ′(p) = a′ and hτ′(q) = b′. Since act
is not enabled, we have a′ 6= b′ with a′ 6= seg and b′ 6= seg. Moreover, we can conclude
that p,q 6∈ validτ′ since hτ|validτ ≡ hτ′ |validτ′ by induction hypothesis. From this we get
p,q 6∈ O as O may only contain valid pointers by definition. Hence, we come up with
the following equalities due to Requirement (2):
a′ = hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O)(p) = hτ|PExp\O(p) = a,
b′ = hτ′ |PExp\fexp(O)(q) = hτ|PExp\O(q) = b.
Since seg 6= a′ 6= b′ 6= seg by assumption, we conclude seg 6= a 6= b 6= seg. This
contradicts enabledness of act in τ. Hence, we have proven that act is indeed enabled
in τ′.
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It remains to establish Requirements (2) to (6). For Requirement (5), consider the
two sets X and X ′ which contain exactly those pointer expressions which t loses own-
ership of by executing the assertion in τ and τ′, respectively. Formally, X and X ′ are
defined as
X := ownpntrsτ \ownpntrsτ.act X ′ := ownpntrsτ′ \ownpntrsτ′.act.
By the definition of owning pointers, this is equivalent to
X = {pexp | pexp ∈ validτ∧hτ(pexp) = hτ(p)
∧hτ(p) ∈ ownpntrsτ∧hτ(p) 6∈ ownpntrsτ.act },
X ′ = {pexp | pexp ∈ validτ′ ∧hτ′(pexp) = hτ′(p)
∧hτ′(p) ∈ ownpntrsτ′ ∧hτ′(p) 6∈ ownpntrsτ′.act }.
Now, we can easily state that both X ∩O = /0 and X ′ ∩O = /0 hold. Hence, Require-
ment (2) from the induction hypothesis gives us hτ(p) = hτ′(p). This ultimately implies
that X = X ′. With this equality at hand, we can now establish Requirement (5) as fol-
lows:
ownpntrsτ′.act = ownpntrsτ′ \X ′
= ownpntrsτ′ \X
= ((ownpntrsτ \O)∪ fexp(O))\X
= ((ownpntrsτ \X)\O)∪ fexp(O)
= (ownpntrsτ.act \O)∪ fexp(O)
For the remaining Requirements note that hτ.act = hτ, validτ.act = validτ and
freedτ.act = freedτ hold. Furthermore, the analogues for τ′ hold, too. To prove the re-
maining Requirements it is now sufficient to apply the above equalities and invoke the
induction hypothesis. uunionsq
D Evaluation Details
This section provides additional information about the experiments discussed in Sec-
tion 5. Figures 2 and 3 give the implementation of the single lock data structures coarse
stack and coarse queue. Moreover, Table 3 provides experimental results for our stress
tests. Those test were conducted using the ownership-respecting semantics. We tested
whether or not our tool is able to detected purposely inserted bugs. For each lineari-
sation point we executed a test where we moved it to an erroneous position: once to
late and once to early. A description of the correct linearisation points can be found
in Table 2). In addition we swapped some assignments. In Treiber’s stack (Figure 4)
we moved the free in pop before the statement reading the value from the node to be
freed. In Michael&Scott’s queue (Figure 5) we moved the statement reading the value
to be returned by dey after the following CAS. Both swapped statements result in unsafe
behavior as potentially freed cells are accessed.
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Figure 2. Coarse Stack
struct Node {
data_type data;
Node* next;
}
Node* ToS;
void init() {
ToS = NULL;
}
void push(data_type val) {
Node* node = new Node();
node ->data = val;
atomic {
node ->next = ToS;
ToS = node;
}
}
bool pop(data_type& dst) {
Node* node;
atomic {
node = ToS;
if (node != NULL)
ToS = node ->next;
}
if (node == NULL) {
return false;
} else {
dst = node ->data;
delete node;
}
}
Figure 3. Coarse Queue
struct Node {
data_type data;
Node* next;
}
Node* Head , Tail;
void init() {
Head = new Node();
Tail = Head;
}
void enq(data_type val) {
Node* node = new Node();
node ->data = val;
node ->next = NULL;
atomic {
Tail ->next = node;
Tail = node;
}
}
bool deq(data_type& dst) {
atomic {
Node* node = Head;
Node* next = Head ->next;
if (next == NULL) {
return false;
} else {
// read data inside
// the atomic block
// to ensure that
// no other thread
// frees "next" in
// between
dst = next ->data;
Head = next;
}
}
delete node;
}
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Figure 4. Treiber’s lock-free stack with linearisation points.
struct pointer_t { Node* ptr; int age; }
struct Node { data_type data; pointer_t next; }
pointer_t ToS;
void init() {
ToS.ptr = NULL;
}
void push(data_type val) {
pointer_t node;
node.ptr = new Node();
node.ptr->data = val;
while (true) {
pointer_t top = ToS;
node.ptr->next = top;
if (DWCAS(ToS, top, node)) // @1
break;
}
}
bool pop(data_type& dst) {
while (true) {
pointer_t top = ToS; // @2
if (top.ptr == NULL) {
return false;
} else {
pointer_t node = top.ptr->next;
if (DWCAS(ToS, top, node)) { // @3
dst = top.ptr->data;
delete top.ptr;
break;
}
}
}
}
bool DWCAS(pointer_t& dst, pointer_t cmp, pointer_t src) {
atomic {
if (dst.ptr == cmp.ptr && dst.age == cmp.age) {
dst.ptr = src.ptr;
dst.age = cmp.age + 1;
return true;
} else return false;
}
}
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Figure 5. Michael&Scott’s lock-free queue with linearisation points.
struct pointer_t { Node* ptr; int age; }
struct Node { data_type data; pointer_t next; }
pointer_t Head , Tail;
void init() {
Head = new Node();
Head.ptr->next = NULL;
Tail = Head;
}
void enq(data_type val) {
pointer_t node;
node.ptr = new Node();
node.ptr->data = val;
node.ptr->next = NULL;
while (true) {
pointer_t tail = Tail;
pointer_t next = tail.ptr->next;
if (tail == Tail)
if (tail.age == Tail.age)
if (next.ptr == NULL) {
if (DWCAS(tail.next , next , node)) // @1
break;
} else DWCAS(Tail , tail , next);
}
DWCAS(Tail , tail , node);
}
bool deq(data_type& dst) {
while (true) {
pointer_t head = Head;
pointer_t tail = Tail;
pointer_t next = head.ptr->next; // @2
if (head == Head)
if (head.age == Head.age)
if (head.ptr == tail.ptr) {
if (next.ptr == NULL) {
return false;
}
DWCAS(Tail , tail , next);
} else {
dst = next.ptr->data;
if (DWCAS(Head , head , next)) { // @3
free(head);
return true;
}
}
}
}
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Table 2. Linearisation points.
Program
Linearisation
Point
Description
Treiber’s stack
@1 CAS in push
@2 reading global top of stack pointer in push
@3 CAS in pop
Michael&Scott’s queue
@1 CAS in enq adding new node to the tail
@2 reading next field of head of queue in deq
@3 CAS in deq moving global head of queue pointer
Table 3. Experimental results for erroneous programs.
Test case Time in seconds Detected defect
Treiber’s stack, bad
linearisation point
@1, early 0.05 value loss
@1, late 0.07 value out of thin air
@2, early 0.08 multiple linearisation events emitted
@2, late 0.05 value loss
@3, early 0.02 value duplication
@3, late 0.02 value out of thin air
Treiber’s stack, swapped
statements
0.001 returned value stems from freed cell
Treiber’s stack, age
fields discarded
0.001 strong pointer race detected
Michael&Scott’s queue
(with false-positive
prevention), bad
linearisation point
@1, early 170 fifo property violated
@1, late 2.7 value out of thin air
@2, early 4.1 multiple linearisation events emitted
@2, late 5.1 value loss
@3, early 0.2 duplicate output
@3, late 0.4 duplicate output
Swapped Statements,
Michael&Scott’s queue
3.78 returned value stems from freed cell
Michael&Scott’s queue,
age fields discarded
0.13 strong pointer race detected
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